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ALD-038        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3941 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE: JOHN SPANN, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (Related to D.C. Crim. No. 04-cr-00758 ) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
November 12, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: December 8, 2010) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Petitioner John Spann was convicted following a jury trial of possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At sentencing, the 
Government submitted copies of court records reflecting Spann’s prior convictions for 
violent felonies in order to establish his status as an armed career criminal under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e).  These convictions included a 1980 state burglary conviction and 1987 
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and 1991 aggravated assault convictions.  The District Court found that Spann is an 
armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), and imposed a 
term of imprisonment of 188 months.  We affirmed on direct appeal, rejecting Spann’s 
argument that the Government’s failure to charge his prior convictions in the indictment 
and prove them to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt violated his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.  United States v. Spann, 243 Fed. Appx. 689 (3d Cir. 2007) (three 
prior felony convictions did not have to be alleged in indictment, submitted to jury, and 
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as grounds for enhancing sentence). 
  On January 6, 2009, Spann filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court, raising the following claims: (1) his state burglary 
conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA; and (2) his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his status as an armed career criminal.  
In an order entered on July 13, 2009, the District Court denied the section 2255 motion 
on the merits.  The District Court recognized that the ACCA provides for a 15-year 
minimum sentence for any person who violates § 922(g) and has three previous “violent 
felony” convictions.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  A “violent felony” is defined in part as “any 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that –  ... (ii) is 
burglary ....”  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  “Burglary” means generic burglary, or “an unlawful 
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to 
commit a crime.”  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).  Where a defendant 
is convicted under a burglary statute and the definition of burglary is broader than the 
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generic definition, such a conviction may qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA 
only if the indictment or information and jury instructions actually required the jury to 
find the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.  Id. at 602. 
 Pennsylvania’s burglary statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a), is broader than § 
924(e)’s generic definition of burglary because it encompasses the unlawful entry of 
certain vehicles and places adapted for carrying on business which are not in an enclosed 
structure.  United States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1109 (3d Cir. 1996).  To determine 
whether the jury was required to find the elements of generic burglary to convict Spann, 
the District Court considered the criminal information, which reflected that Spann was 
charged with entering a residence at 1927 S. 8th Street in Philadelphia with the intent to 
commit a theft of currency and household items.  See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 25-26 (2005) (court may review charging document and comparable judicial records 
to determine whether crime involved generic burglary); Bennett, 100 F.3d at 1110 
(same).  Because Spann’s burglary conviction was based on his unlawful entry of a 
building with the intent to commit a crime, which fits the generic definition of burglary, it 
was properly used as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA. 
Spann appealed, but we denied his application for a certificate of 
appealability on April 22, 2010 in United States v. Spann, C.A. No. 10-1379.  
Meanwhile, on February 1, 2010, Spann filed a motion in the sentencing court for relief 
under Rules 60(b)(1) and 59(e).  Spann contended that the section 2255 proceedings 
should be reopened on the basis of Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008) 
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(driving under influence does not constitute violent felony), and because he had been 
deprived of his right to file post-judgment motions.  In an order entered on March 5, 
2010, the District Court denied the motion, explaining that there was no clear error in the 
court’s original decision to deny section 2255 relief.  On October 6, 2010, we denied 
Spann a certificate of appealability, stating: “The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See Brown v. Phila. Housing Authority, 350 F.3d 
338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
appellant’s motion, because Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), does not 
support appellant’s argument that his burglary conviction, with respect to whether it 
constitutes a violent felony, is similar in  kind as well as in degree of risk posed to a 
conviction for driving under the influence.” 
  Spann now files a petition for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
in this Court, in which he has again challenged the use of his state burglary conviction to 
enhance his sentence under the ACCA.  Spann contends that justice requires 
consideration of the fact that he “burglarized a single home, which was observed for any 
occupants once the owner had left.  This observation for others thus negated the 
possibility of confrontation and physical contact with the Petitioner, thus risk to any party 
was virtually nil.”  (Petition, at 20.)  In arguing that his burglary conviction does not 
constitute a “generic burglary” under the ACCA’s residual clause, Spann relies upon two 
new decisions he says were not previously available to him.  In the first, Chambers v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 691-92 (U.S. 2009), the United States Supreme Court held 
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that the State of Illinois’ failure-to-report to a penal institution offense did not have as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.  It was a relatively 
passive offense calling for inaction that did not involve conduct presenting a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another, and thus did not qualify as a “violent felony” 
under the ACCA.  See id. at 692.  In the second, our Not Precedential decision in United 
States v. Lewis, 330 Fed. Appx. 353 (3d Cir. 2009), we held that a burglary conviction 
under an Ohio statute in effect in 1991 did not constitute a violent felony under the 
ACCA.  There, we reasoned that, under the Ohio statute, burglary involves no likelihood 
of presence “if committed at a time when the occupants are normally absent for a reason 
like work or school, and no one else has any reason to be there.”  Id. at 364.   
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives 
from 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”  A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary 
situations.  See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify 
the use of this extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable 
right to the writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See 
Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  “Given its drastic nature, a 
writ of mandamus should not be issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary 
appeal.”  In re: Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting  Hahnemann 
University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir.1996)). 
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  Spann contends that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief he 
desires.  We do not agree that Spann can satisfy this mandamus requirement.  Although 
Chambers and Lewis are relatively new cases, Spann’s argument that his state burglary 
conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA dates back to his 
original section 2255 motion.  Spann took advantage of a proper means to present his 
argument, collateral review.  The fact that he is now barred by AEDPA’s restrictions on 
filing a successive section 2255 motion does not make mandamus an available remedy.  
Mandamus does not become available simply because the sentencing court previously 
denied relief under section 2255 or because the gatekeeping provisions of section 2255 
make it difficult to pursue a successive motion.  Cf.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 
(3d Cir.1997) (federal habeas corpus petition not available simply because petitioner 
cannot meet AEDPA’s stringent gatekeeping requirements).  Moreover, both Chambers 
and Lewis were issued in 2009, and so Spann could have argued them in his 2010 Rule 
60(b) motion, which was considered and denied on the merits.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  
